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REM JURISDICTION AND THE
INTERNATIONAL SHOE MINIMUM
CONTACTS DOCTRINE
U. S. Industries v. Gregg'
In 1969 F. Browne Gregg contracted to sell three businesses to U.S.
Industries (U.S.I.). Pursuant to the contract, Gregg was to receive 100,962
common shares and 8,750 preferred shares of U. S. Industries stock. In
addition, he was to be retained as president of the three companies and
receive additional common stock based on the profitability of the busi-
nesses. In consideration therefor Gregg was to transfer the businesses to
Diversacon (a subsidiary of U.S.I.), contribute one million dollars in capital
to the businesses, and execute a $500,000 installment note to Diversacon.
In 1971 a dispute arose between Gregg and U.S.I., and Gregg was
removed as president of the businesses. U.S.I. filed suit against Gregg
claiming twenty million dollars damage. U.S.I., a Delaware corporation
doing business in New York, obtained jurisdiction over Gregg, a Florida
resident, by sequestering Gregg's U.S.I. stock pursuant to the Delaware
sequestration statute.2 Delaware law provides that the situs of stock in
Delaware corporations is Delaware.' The Uniform Commercial Code pro-
vides that the situs of stock is the location of the certificate of ownership.4
Gregg removed the proceeding to federal court based on its diversity
jurisdiction and there challenged the Delaware sequestration procedure as
a violation of due process. His challenge was overruled.5 Gregg then
allowed a default judgment to be entered in favor of U.S.I., since Delaware
law would subject him to full in personam liability if he answered the
complaint.6
Gregg appealed to the Third Circuit and renewed his allegation that
1. 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3289 (U.S. Oct.
12, 1976) (No. 76-359).
2. DEL. CODE tit. X, § 366 (1974).
3. DEL. CODE tit. VIII, § 169 (1974).
4. U.C.C. § 8-317. Since Delaware is the only state in the nation which did not
adopt U.C.C. § 8-317, it may be possible to challenge the Delaware statute as an
unconstitutional burden on commerce. The U.C.C. rule was designed to enhance
the transferability of shares by only permitting attachment of the stock in the
jurisdiction where the certificate is located. The advantage of the U.C.C. rule is that
a bona fide purchaser may buy the certificate with confidence in his title. This
would not be true under the Delaware statute. As a result, the Delaware statute may
constitute an undue burden on commerce. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,
359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); South
Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
5. U. S. Industries v. Gregg, 348 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Del. 1972).
6. Sands v. Lefcourt Realty Corp., 35 Del. Ch. 340, 117 A.2d 365 (1955).
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the Delaware sequestration statute, as applied to him, constituted a denial
of due process of law. The appellate court agreed. The court held that the
International Shoe Co. v. Washington7 "minimum contacts" doctrine applies
to actions quasi in rem such as these brought under the Delaware sequestra-
tion statute. In applying the minimum contacts doctrine to Gregg, the
court found that Gregg had insufficient contacts with the forum state,
Delaware, and reversed the default judgment for lack of jurisdiction.
Prior to the establishment of the International Shoe minimum contacts
doctrine in 1945, the "territorial" theory of jurisdiction, as laid down in
Pennoyer v. Neff,' prevailed. The territorial theory of jurisdiction provided
that the jurisdiction of courts was limited by the territorial boundaries of
the state from which their authority was derived. A court could assert
jurisdiction over any property located within the state, 9 any nonresident of
the state who was served with process while within the territorial bound-
aries of the state,'0 or any resident of the state even though he was outside
the territorial boundaries." Courts also developed fictional doctrines of
implied consent12 and "presence" 8 to expand their jurisdiction over
nonresidents.
From this territorial theory of power there developed three types of
jurisdiction.14 The first, in personam jurisdiction, gives a court the power to
render a judgment against a defendant or his general assets. It is usually
commenced by service of process on a defendant within the territorial
limits of the state. In rem jurisdiction gives a court the power to determine
the rights, liabilities, and interest of the entire world in a specific piece of
property. A court could assert in rem jurisdiction over any property found
within the state. The final basis, quasi in rem jurisdiction, is a hybrid of the
first two. Jurisdiction is assumed by the attachment of defendant's property
located within the territorial limits of the state. However, unlike in rem
jurisdiction, a court asserting quasi in rem jurisdiction does not ajudicate
rights and interests in the property itself. Rather, the claim is usually a
7. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
8. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
9. M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE, 36-37 (1972).
10. Darrah v. Watson, 36 Iowa 116 (1873); Barrell v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. 354
(1819).
11. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) (a Wyoming court properly
asserted jurisdiction over a Wyoming resident who had been served with process in
Colorado); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (exercise of jurisdiction
over a United States citizen who had been served with process in France was
constitutionally permissible).
12. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (upheld Massachusetts statute which
stipulated that a nonresident who operated a motor vehicle on Massachusetts
highways was deemed to have appointed the registrar of the state as his agent for
service of process). See also Scott, Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Motorists, 39 HARV.
L. REv. 563 (1950).
13. Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); Barrow S.S. Co. v.
Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898).
14. See M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE, at 36-37 (1972).
[Vol. 42
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personal claim for a money judgment and unrelated to the property. The
court gains the power to ajudicate the in personam claim, without in per-
sonam jurisdiction, by the location of defendant's property within the state.
Yet, unlike an in personam claim, a quasi in rem claim is limited to the value
of the property attached. Further, a final judgment does not render the in
personam claim res judicata, and it can be pursued in a subsequent action on
the same claim.
15
In 1945, the narrow territorial theory of power was greatly expanded
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington. 16 Defendant International Shoe, a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Missouri, was
sued by the state of Washington to recover unpaid contributions to the
state unemployment compensation fund. Service of process was effected
on defendant's agent in the forum state, Washington. Defendant denied
the agency. Defendant also was served with process by registered mail at its
office in St. Louis, Missouri. Defendant specially appeared and challenged
the exercise of jurisdiction by the Washington court as a violation of due
process. Relying on the Pennoyer territorial theory of power, defendant
contended that the exercise of jurisdiction exceeded the territorial bound-
aries of the state because defendant was not present within the state and
had no agent within the state on which process could be served. The
United States Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of the Washington
courts.
After International Shoe, Pennoyer was still valid precedent to the extent
that it signified that a court's authority was limited by the territorial bound-
aries of the state in which it exists. However, International Shoe expanded
Pennoyer to the extent that a court could assert in personam jurisdiction over
a person or corporation outside the territorial limits of the state, provided
that such person or corporation had sufficient contacts with the forum
state. Furthermore, such contacts must have been related to the cause of
action, such that the exercise of jurisdiction would not offend due process
notions of fair play and substantial justice. The basic question after Interna-
tional Shoe, then, is whether it would be fair to force the defendant to
litigate his liability in the forum asserting jurisdiction. In making such a
determination, the court must consider the nature and quality of defen-
dant's contacts with the forum state.17
15. Riverview State Bank v. Dreyer, 188 Kan. 270, 362 P.2d 55 (1961); Strand
v. Halverson, 220 Iowa 1276, 264 N.W. 266 (1935); Oil Well Supply Co. v. Koen, 64
Ohio St. 422, 60 N.E. 603 (1901).
16. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
17. Id. at 316-19. The classic statement of the minimum contacts doctrine as
laid down in International Shoe is:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the mainte-
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The twin requirements of International Shoe, i.e., that the defendant
have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state and that the cause
of action be related thereto, seem only just. For example, assume a plaintiff
residing in New Hampshire sues a resident of Utah in a New Hampshire
court for a tortious act which occurred in Utah. The defendant's sole
contact with New Hampshire is the ownership of ten acres of land within
the state. The New Hampshire court, under the minimum contacts doc-
trine, should decline to assert in personamjurisdiction over the Utah defen-
dant. The basis of jurisdiction, the ownership of ten acres of land in the
state, is contact with the state of New Hampshire, but it is unrelated to the
cause of action which can be more fairly litigated elsewhere. Further, it
would constitute an undue burden on the defendant to require him to
litigate in New Hampshire because the witnesses and evidence are located
elsewhere.
The application of the International Shoe minimum contacts doctrine to
quasi in rem jurisdiction, as in Gregg, is rare. The majority of courts have
assumed that the minimum contracts doctrine is inapplicable because the
traditional basis of both in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction is the physical
location of the defendant's property within the territorial limits of the state.
Apparently, the courts further assume that the minimum contacts doc-
trine, even if it does apply to actions quasi in rem, is a low threshold test
which is automatically satisfied by the location of the property within the
state.1 8 A strong current of scholarly opinion has disputed this view.1 9
[Wi]hether due process is satisfied must depend ... upon the quality
and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration
of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.
That clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judg-
ment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which
the state has no contacts, ties or relations.
18. See Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 229 (Del. Super., 1976):
There are significant constitutional questions at issue here but we say at
once that we do not deem the rule of International Shoe to be one of them
... . The reason, of course, is that jurisdiction under § 366 remains...
quasi in rem founded on the presence of capital stock here, not on prior
contact by defendants with this forum.
See also Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); Breech v. Hughes Tool Co., 41 Del.
Gh. 128, 189 A.2d 428 (1963).
19. Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARV. L.
REv. 303, 306 (1962):
In the light of the emerging concept of personal jurisdiction, the quasi in
rem procedure is rarely useful to plaintiff except in cases which the
defendant ought not to be asked to defend in the forum chosen by the
plaintiff.
Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. Rv. 657, 663 (1959);
Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of
State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569, 617 (1958); Martin, Secured Transactions, 19
WAYNE L. Rxv. 593, 641 (1973):
[M]odern long-arm statutes give the state power over the nonresident
when it is fair to do so. Thus jurisdiction obtained by attachment seems to
[Vol. 42
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Application of the majority rule overlooks the fact that the underpinning
of its rationale, location of the defendant's property within the state, is
often questionable when applied to intangibles, the situs of which is often a
matter of dispute.20 More importantly, with the dramatic expansion of the
availability of in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents after International
Shoe, quasi in rem jurisdiction over nonresidents is arguably of two types,
that which is unnecessary and that which is unfair.2 1
Following the decision in International Shoe, states began enacting
"long-arm" statutes to take advantage of their newly expanded jurisdiction
over nonresidents. The Illinois long-arm statute,22 which provided a model
for many states, allowed Illinois courts to exercise jurisdiction provided
that the cause of action was related to the transaction of any business within
the state; the commission of a tortious act within the state; ownership, use,
or possession of any real estate situated in the state; or contracting to insure
any person, property, or risk located within the state. California's long-arm
statute23 is the broadest. It provides that California courts may assert
long-arm jurisdiction is any suit where the assertion of jurisdiction would
not violate either the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment or
the California Constitution.
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. 24 is one of several cases which
indicated the breadth of a state court's in personam jurisdiction under the
minimum contacts doctrine. In McGee, the defendant life insurance com-
pany's only contact with the state of California was the issuance of a life
insurance policy to a California resident. The Court found sufficient con-
tacts with the forum state in that defendant had issued a contract which
had substantial connection with the forum state. In Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.25 Titan Valve Manufacturing Co., a
resident of Ohio, manufactured safety valves which it shipped to American
Radiator in Pennsylvania to be incorporated into water heaters destined for
interstate commerce. The plaintiff, a resident of Illinois, suffered personal
injuries due to the explosion of a water heater caused by a negligently
fall into two categories: that which could have been obtained in the alterna-
tive by long arm statutes. . . and that which could not have been, falling
outside the limits of fairness.
20. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246-47 (1958). Traynor, Is This
Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 657, 663 (1959):
It is time we had done with mechanical distinctions between in rem and in
personam, high time now in a mobile society where property increasingly
becomes intangible and the fictional res becomes stronger and stranger.
Insofar as courts remain given to asking "Res, res - who's got the res?"
they cripple their evaluation of the real factors that should determine
jurisdiction.
21. Martin, Secured Transactions, 19 WAYNE L. REV 593, 641 (1973).
22. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968).
23. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
24. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
25. 22 I11. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
1977] 439
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constructed valve. An Illinois court asserted long-arm jurisdiction over
Titan Valve on the theory that it had committed a tortious act in Illinois.
The court held the site of the commission of a tortious act is the place of the
occurrence of the final act which is necessary to make the actor liable. In
this case, the negligent construction of the valve did not result in liability
until the plaintiff suffered personal injuries from the explosion in Illinois.
Therefore, application of the Illinois long-arm statute was held not viola-
tive of due process as applied to Titan Valve.
Although McGee and Gray may represent the outside limits of the
minimum contacts doctrine, 26 it is clear that the doctrine permits a court
considerable latitude in the assertion of jurisdiction over nonresidents. 27
Because of this latitude, it has been argued that where inpersonam jurisdic-
tion cannot be asserted under the minimum contacts doctrine, the assump-
tion of quasi in rem jurisdiction is inherently unfair.28 It provides a plaintiff
with only limited jurisdiction and encourages multiple litigation resulting
in waste of judicial resources.2 9 More importantly, where the minimum
contacts requirements cannot be met, then the cause of action is probably
so unrelated to the forum as to make the assumption of jurisdiction a
violation of due process. The unfairness can best be illustrated by example.
Assume a resident of Alabama sustains personal injuries as a result of a
Winconsin resident's negligence in causing an automobile accident in Wis-
consin. However, the defendant owns $1,000 worth of property in Alaba-
ma and the plaintiff seeks to assert quasi in rem jurisdiction over the
defendant by attachment of his property. Principles of fairness, on which
26. See Taylor v. Portland Paramount Corp., 383 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1967)
(Suit against Elizabeth Taylor for damages due to loss of patronage when movie-
goers boycotted the film Cleopatra, in which she starred, because of her misconduct
with Richard Burton. Held: Insufficient contacts with the forum state for the
exercise of jurisdiction); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir.
1966) (Libel suit by the commander of the Alabama Highway Patrol against the
Saturday Evening Post for an article referring to the patrol as "those bastards." The
court held that the defendant's contacts were insufficient for the exercise of jurisd-
iction, although the Post had Alabama circulation, because the incident had taken
place in Mississippi and the article had been written in New York).
27. See Duple Motor Bodies Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir.
1969) (Defendant, a British corporation, manufactured bus bodies for a second
British corporation for resale in Hawaii. Jurisdiction was upheld on the basis of
defendant's knowledge that the bus bodies would be resold in Hawaii); Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (Permissible for Ohio state court
to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant on a claim unrelated to the
forum state, because defendant had systematically and continuously conducted
business within the state).
28. Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARV. L.
REv. 303, 306 (1962); Martin, Secured Transactions, 19 WAYNE L. REv. 593, 641
(1973).
29. See Riverview State Bank v. Dreyer, 188 Kan. 270, 362 P.2d 55 (1961);
Strand v. Halverson, 220 Iowa 1276, 264 N.W. 266 (1935); Oil Well Supply Co. v.
Koen, 64 Ohio St. 422, 60 N.E. 603 (1901). A judgment quasi in rem does not have
res judicata effect, and thereby encourages multiple litigation.
[Vol. 42
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the Due Process Clause is based, would seem to dictate that Alabama refuse
to assert jurisdiction. The defendant's contacts with the forum, Alabama,
are minimal and unrelated to the cause of action. Further, the witnesses,
evidence, and defendant are all located in a distant forum, Wisconsin.
In the preceding example, the unfairness is heightened if Alabama,
like Delaware,30 does not recognize a limited appearance. Defendant would
be faced with litigating the case in a distant and unrelated forum, or losing
his property by default judgment. In Gregg the defendant was faced with
the choice of losing two million dollars worth of stock by default judgment,
or defending his property and thereby submitting to full in personam
liability on a twenty million dollar claim in a forum he probably had never
even visited.
The traditional basis of quasi in rem jurisdiction, the physical location
of property within the borders of the state, is questionable in any case when
applied to intangibles. The situs of intangibles can be a matter of con-
troversy 31 and often more than one state can make a credible claim thereto.
In Atkinson v. Superior Court32 the court rejected the concept of a fictional
situs for intangibles and required the satisfaction of the minimum contacts
doctrine before quasi in rem jurisdiction could be asserted. The plaintiffs in
that case attacked the validity of a contract and trust agreement negotiated
by the American Federation of Musicians with their employers. The plain-
tiffs asserted jurisdiction over a nonresident trustee. Quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion was upheld because the cause of action had sufficient contacts with the
forum state. The court noted that the trusteeship grew out of plaintiffs'
employment within the state and the payments were consideration for
work performed within the state. Atkinson is important because it de-
manded sufficient contacts between the cause of action and the forum state
before quasi in rem jurisdiction could be asserted.3 3 However, had Califor-
nia's current long-arm statute been in effect at the time of the Atkinson
decision 4 the court could have asserted full in personam jurisdiction over
the nonresident. Because the court found sufficient contacts between the
30. Sands v. Lefcourt Realty Corp., 35 Del. Ch. 340, 117 A.2d 365 (1955).
31. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246-47 (1958): Tax Comm. v.
Aldreich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942). See also Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37
TEXAS L. REV. 657, 663 (1959).
32. 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
33. Atkinson was cited in Camire v. Scieszka, 358 A.2d 397 (N.H. 1976). In
Camire, a New Hampshire resident brought suit against a Missouri resident for
injuries suffered in an out-of-state auto accident. Plaintiff asserted quasi in rem
jurisdiction over the defendant's insurance company's obligation to insure and
defend the defendant against liability. Plaintiff contended that this obligation
constituted a debt, and that under the rule of Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905),
could be attached in any state where defendant's insurance company could be
served with process. The Camire court declined to assert jurisdiction. The court
based its decision on the International Shoe minimum contacts doctrine, and denied
jurisdiction for lack of such contacts.
34. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
1977]
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defendant and the forum state, the minimum contacts requirements for in
personam jurisdiction would also have been satisfied.
Where an intangible res is the asserted basis for jurisdiction as in
Atkinson, the unfairness which can result from quasi in rem jurisdiction is
greatly compounded. In Seider v. Roth35 a New York resident instituted suit
in New York for personal injuries sustained as a result of the negligence of
a Canadian citizen and resident in causing an automobile accident in
Vermont. The plaintiff attempted to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction over
the defendant by attachment of an insurance policy issued in Canada by a
company which did business in New York. The plaintiff argued that the
insurance company owed a debt to the defendant by reason of its obligation
to insure and indemnify him against liability. Under the rule of Harris v.
Balk,36 a debt is located and can be attached wherever the debtor can be
found. Therefore, the plaintiff asserted that the insurance policy could be
attached in New York where the insurance company was doing business.
The Seider court found quasi in rem jurisdiction to have been properly
assumed. Subsequent New York decisions have reaffirmed Seider,3 7 al-
though numerous other jurisdictions have rejected the Seider rule.38
Seider demonstrates the problems presented by assignment of a fic-
tional situs to intangibles for purposes of quasi in rem jurisdiction. The
Seider rule would permit a plaintiff to shop for a forum, which not only
greatly inconveniences the defendant, but also provides the plaintiff with
the greatest procedural advantage. However, a subsequent New York
decision 39 which limited the Seider rule to cases brought by a resident of
New York, or cases where the cause of action accrued in New York, may
mitigate the potential for forum shopping. Even so, it seems preferable
even in those situations that the forum state be required to fulfill the
requirements of the minimum contacts doctrine before quasi in rem juris-
diction is asserted. If such minimal contacts are not present, then it is not
fair to make the defendant defend the case in that forum. A forum with a
stronger connection with the cause of action, its evidence, and witnesses,
would be the logical forum in which to litigate the claim.
It is interesting to note, however, that the Gregg court, after deciding
35. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966).
36. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
37. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305,287 N.Y.S.2d 633,234 N.E.2d 669
(1967); Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968).
38. State Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 942 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1970); Howard v. Allen, 254 S.C. 455, 176 S.E.2d 127 (1970); Ricker v.
LaJoie, 314 F. Supp. 401 (D. Vt. 1970); DeRentiis v. Lewis, 106 R.I. 240, 258 A.2d
454 (1969).
The Atkinson case has been suggested as a solution to Seider. See Minichiello v.
Rosenberg: Garnishment of Intangibles-In Search of a Rationale, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 407
422 (1969); Stein, Jurisdiction by Attachment of Liability Insurance, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1075, 1109 (1968); Note, Seider v. Roth: The Constitutional Phase, 43 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV., 58, 81 (1968).
39. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968).
[Vol. 42
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that the International Shoe minimum contacts doctrine should be applied,
may have misapplied the doctrine. In Gregg, the defendant owned two
million dollars worth of stock in a Delaware corporation which he obtained
pursuant to a contract which was the basis of the cause of action. The twin
requirements of International Shoe, that the defendant have sufficient con-
tacts with the forum state which are related to the cause of action such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and justice, appear to be met.
The Gregg court's justification was that neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant was a resident of Delaware. Gregg was correctly labelled as a
resident of Florida. The court also found that U.S.I. was only a technical
resident of Delaware because, although it was incorporated in Delaware, it
did no business there. The court then reasoned that it would be improper
to allow Delaware law to dictate that the situs of Gregg's U.S.I. stock was
Delaware solely on the basis of technical residency. In view of the court's
determination that the situs of the stock and the residence of both parties
were not in Delaware, assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction was deemed
improper due to the lack of minimum contacts.
A contrary analysis and result could easily have been supported. U.S.I.
did incorporate in Delaware, and the stock, which is the basis of the cause
of action, constitutes ownership in a Delaware corporation. Clearly, Gregg
did contract to acquire stock in a Delaware corporation and this contract is
the basis of the cause of action. This should satisfy the minimum contacts
requirement if the holdings in Gray and McGee are accepted. The contract
to buy stock in a Delaware corporation in Gregg appears to be equivalent to
the contract to insure a California resident in McGee. In both cases, the
defendant was a nonresident of the state where the cause of action arose
and never physically entered the state. Further, both cases involve a con-
tract to purchase an intangible. Gray also involved a nonresident who never
entered the state. The exercise of jurisdiction in Gregg, based on the
minimum contacts doctrine, would therefore appear to be proper.
If quasi in rem jurisdiction was not permitted except in those cases
where the minimum contacts requirements are fulfilled, attachment in aid
of jurisdiction would appear to be unnecessary. It could be obtained only
where the defendant had sufficient contacts with the forum state to fulfill
the minimum contacts requirements. In such cases, quasi in rem jurisdiction
would serve no useful purpose because once the minimum contacts re-
quirements were satisfied the court could assert full in personam jurisdic-
tion. However, it should be noted that although pre-judgment attachment
would be obsolete for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction, it would still
serve the purpose, separate and apart from quasi in rem jurisdiction, of
securing against the dissipation of defendant's assets prior to judgment. °
40. Mo. R. CIV. P. 85.01 provides twelve instances wherein prejudgment
attachment may be exercised by a plaintiff even though not for the purpose of
obtaining jurisdiction over a nonresident. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 85.01 (3)-(14).
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